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FEDERAL REVIEW
REPORT OF AVIATION FACILITIES STUDY GROUP TO
THE BUDGET BUREAU, DECEMBER 31, 1955
PART I-CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

F

IFTY YEARS AGO the sky was virtually uninhabited by man and his
inventions. In 50 years the air has become the principal medium for
the conduct of offensive and defensive military operations. The growth
of the air transportation industry, which has resulted in some of the largest
airlines carrying more inter-city passengers than the largest railroads, is
well-known. The growth of miscellaneous commercial and private flyingtermed "General Aviation" -is not so well appreciated. It is surprising
to many, for example, to find that there are more than fifty times as many
aircraft engaged in General Aviation as are flown by the U. S. airlines, and
that these airplanes fly two and one-half times as many aircraft miles as
the airlines fly.
Aircraft are not the only users of the airspace. Other demands on it
include artillery and missile ranges, restricted security areas, defense warning zones, TV and radio towers. In brief, the sky above us is being used
for a variety of purposes and what goes on in it is destined to affect the
lives of every living person.
In the course of our study we have asked many questions relating to
the use of the airspace and the adequacy of facilities required for- its
efficient use. (We think of Aviation Facilities as comprising airports, navigation aids, traffic control devices, and the communications that link them
together.) The answers that we have received have convinced us that much
of our airspace is already overcrowded and that, in many important areas,
the development of airports, navigation aids, and especially our air traffic
control system, is lagging far behind both aeronautical development and
the needs of our mobile population and of our industry.
Reports presented to us by responsible groups indicate that the risks
of mid-air collisions have already reached critical proportions, and that the
collision hazard is becoming greater as the increases in civil and military
air traffic outpace the capabilities of outmoded traffic control facilities.
This condition is not, apparently, due to lack of scientific knowledge
necessary for a solution. The Defense Department is even now proceeding
with the installation of a $3 billion air defense radar system which, we are
advised, could be adapted to provide the main elements of safe and efficient
aircraft separation and traffic control wherever required. The deficiency
in our traffic control system is attributable in part, to the fact that aircraft
capabilities and public demand for air transportation have proceeded much
faster than anticipated. It is also due to the lack of general appreciation of
the need for a "systems" approach to our aviation facilities development.
Because of this lack of appreciation, the technical knowledge which is available has not been fully utilized and the programs needed to meet our traffic
control requirements have not been formulated.
The multimillion dollar leviathans of the air which our aircraft manufacturing industry is creating in the jet age must become integral parts of
a transportation system which includes the airport complex (with adequate
approach areas), the airway (with its traffic control, navigation and instrument landing devices) and the associated communications on the ground
and in the air. All of the Aviation Facilities mentioned have to be developed
concurrently with the development of the aircraft which will use them.
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This systems development concept has administrative and fiscal as well
as technical aspects. It is necessary, for example, to determine who is to
finance the building of the system, who is to pay for its operation, and how
its operation is to be administered as well as who is responsible for designing it to serve national as well as local needs.
The evidence is abundant that, in attempting to meet our national Aviation Facilities requirements, we are following a piecemeal rather than a
systems approach. The responsibility for meeting the requirements is diffused, the procedures for coordination among those have the responsibility
is highly complex and often ineffective.
Against this general background, which is more fully described in the
following Sections of this report, we submit our answers to the questions
you have asked us:
QUESTION No. 1. Should a study of long-range needs for aviation facilities and aids be undertaken?
Our answer to this question is definitely affirmative. We have
analyzed reports on almost every subject related to aviation. While
a great deal of thought has been given to Aviation Facilities requirements, it is our considered opinion that there is still no top
level systems study and master plan which would provide the executive branch and affected agencies of the government with a firm
basis upon which to build a comprehensive legislative and fiscal
program for Aviation Facilities development. We do not believe
that the necessary facts have yet been put together in proper form.
We, therefore, conclude that there is a need for a comprehensive
study leading to a national plan for the Aviation Facilities of the
United States for the next twenty years.
In recommending that a major study to undertaken, we would
like to state that we do not regard the study which we recommend
as an end in itself, but merely as a necessary prelude or accompaniment to an integrated Aviation Facilities development program
which is urgently required in the interest of public safety, military
security, and the national economy.
QUESTION No. 2. What should be the coverage of such a study, if it
should be made, including an indication of the specific areas and subjects
which seem to require particularattention?
We need to know a great deal more about:
1. How to make more efficient use of the national airspace by
allocation and traffic control which is safe, efficient, and
equitable for all users.
2. How to integrate civil and military expenditures, particularly expenditures for Aviation Facilities research and development.
3. How the cost of facilities should be financed from private
and public sources.
4. What kind of government organization is required to control
use of the airspace and be responsible for the appropriate
Federal interest in the construction and use of governmentfinanced military and civil Aviation Facilities.
QUESTION No. 3. How can such a study, if made, best be organized
and conducted?
We conclude that the study which we recommend should be made
under the direction of an individual of national reputation, with a
broad understanding of civil and military aviation. He should be
given a temporary appointment to plan with all departments and
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agencies of the executive branch at every level, without being restricted to narrow channels of communications.
The appointment should be made in such a way that it is clearly
the appointee's responsibility, backed by Presidental authority, to
work through and with existing organizations and avoid duplication
of the services which they are able to provide. We are of the opinion
that most of the areas requiring intensive study leading to an
integrated Aviation Facilities program could under effective central
leadership be undertaken in cooperation with the Departments of
Commerce and Defense.
In general we feel that the personal qualifications of the individual selected may be more important than the position to which
he is assigned in the government; but the two are obviously closely
interrelated and we feel strongly that the position should be set up
independently of any of the existing operating departments and
interdepartmental committees in order to assure objectivity and
freedom from deep involvement in day-to-day operating problems.
Unless some urgent action of this nature is taken to provide
full time high-level leadership to the problem of bringing our Aviation Facilities in line with air traffic growth and the progress being
made in aircraft development ever more dangerous conditions in
the air can be anticipated.
Finally, it is our considered opinion that the studies which we recommend in our answers to Questions 1 and 2 would very likely be ineffective
and wasteful of manhours and expense unless pursued under independent
central direction at a high government level as recommended in our reply
to Question 3.
WILLIAM BARCLAY HARDING,
GEORGE P. BAKER
FRED

M. GLASS

N. E.

HALABY

Chairman

HAROLD R. HARRIS
JEROME LEDERER

T. F.
J.

WALKOWICZ
GORDON BENNETT

PART II- EXCERPTS
SECTION

1-FUTURE AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE,
AND OPERATING COSTS

PRODUCTIVITY,

By T. F. Walkowicz
Any study of requirements for a period of twenty years ahead necessitates some arbitrary projections about the future. A list of the basic assumptions against which the projections in this report have been made are: No
global war - continued tension - local incidents; USA vulnerable to enemy
attack; U.S. population increasing to about 210-220 million; Gross national
product to about $715-740 billion (1955 dollars) ; Defense expenditures
maintained at about $30-40 billion.
Projections and predictions in the field of aeronautics have proved hazardous in the past, for technology is generally moving ahead faster than
predicted by the "experts." As late as 1941, for example, jet propulsion was
considered impractical by a group of leading American scientists and industrialists when called together to appraise its significance. Yet at that
very moment - it was later found - the Germans were already flying a jet
propelled airplane.
Four principal factors appear to characterize future aircraft design and
performance.
First, aircraft speeds can be expected to increase greatly. Commercial
transport operating speeds can be expected to rise from today's 300 miles
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per hour to 1,000 miles per hour by the end of the twenty-year period.
Military operations in the supersonic ranges will be commonplace.
Second, today's maximum civil operating altitude of about 25,000 feet
will be increased to 40,000 or higher, putting jet airliners into the same
airspace that is now the province of the military.
Third, civil aircraft will show greatly increased productivity. Productivity is the payload multiplied by the number of miles operable within a
given period. For example, one of our latest type transports now in transatlantic service has the capability of carrying about 40,000 passengers both
ways between New York and London annually. Each one of the jet transports
being ordered for transatlantic use in 1959 and 1960 could produce about
three times this volume of annual passenger transportation. By way of
comparison, it has been pointed out that each of the new jet transports will
have approximately the same annual transatlantic passenger carrying capacity as some of the larger luxury liners in the ocean trade.
Fourth, is the trend toward lower direct operating costs. The direct seatmile cost of operating passenger aircraft is expected to go down about thirty
percent in the twenty-year period. The direct operating ton-mile cost of
cargo aircraft is expected to be reduced about 80 percent by 1975. Atomic
freighters will probably not be introduced until the end of the twenty-year
period and their probable operating cost are still very uncertain.
The progress projected in transport and military aircraft will undoubtedly be reflected in the design of private and business aircraft, thus
making them increasingly useful and productive in business and industry.
Helicopters and other vertically rising or steep gradient aircraft are
expected to come into greatly increased use during the next twenty years.
The operating cost of today's helicopter is 10 to 15 times that of fixed wing
aircraft. By the late 1960's, the direct operating cost of helicopters is expected to decline to about 3 times that of fixed-wing aircraft. At these cost
levels, helicopters may begin coming into more general use, especially where
ground transportation is slow and expensive. It is too early to predict, with
any accuracy, when other vertical rising and steep gradient aircraft will be
ready to provide safe transportation at reasonable cost.
In summary -future civil and military aircraft will fly much faster, at
much higher altitudes, carrying greater loads, and they will do this at significantly lower direct operating costs. Furthermore, vertical rising and steep
gradient aircraft will begin in an important way to take their place in the
national transportation picture.
SECTION 4 - AIRPORTS

By Fred M. Glass
As the expanding requirements of commerce and defense have caused
unprecedented congestion of the airspace and overload airways facilities,
demands on airports and terminals have in a great many instances, stretched
them to the limits of their capacity.
The airport should be regarded as an integral part of a national Aviation
Facilities system, but it is too often evident that airport planning is primarily based on local considerations which, in many instances, are not
properly related to national objectives; and that airport design, particularly
for future construction is not coordinated with anticipated operating requirements of future aircraft nor with the capacity of the air traffic control
system.
There are about 700 major civil and military airports. There are over
6,000 additional civil airports (of lesser significance).
The Federal Government's responsibilities for airport development fall
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into two broad categories: first, is the field of planning; and second, is the
field of financial participation. The orderly development of military and
civil airports requires long-range planning -planning
of an overall or
master plan nature -so
that those primarily responsible for the development, financing and management of airports at the local level can have the
essential information required.
Cities and local communities should be advised of traffic requirements
which their airports should be prepared to meet in 1960, in 1965, and in
1975 so that airports will not become bottlenecks of an improved Aviation
Facilities system. They should be provided with continuously revised estimates of plane movements in order that ample terminal facilities and handling space can be provided; the operating characteristics and tire footprint
pressures of future aircraft, etc., in order that land acquisition, runway
lengths and weight bearing characteristics will be adequate. Plans for
nearby military and civil airports should be coordinated in order that runways may be properly located and traffic control procedures properly integrated.
Additional factors, such as the future role of the seaplane in military
and commercial operations; characteristics and anticipated volume in urban
areas of vertical lift and steep gradient aircraft must be estimated and the
forecasts made known to the local airport planner.
The high noise level of jet powered aircraft has created extremely difficult problems in community relations for the military services and will
create additional problems of a very serious nature for civilian operators
as jet powered aircraft are introduced, unless the designers can find a
solution.
The Federal Government, in setting military aircraft procurement
specifications, and in the allocation of research and development funds,
could, in our opinion, do much more than is being done toward the solution
of the noise problem.
The mention of Federal financial participation in a national system of
civil airports raises, first, considerations as to the size of the program,
and, secondly, how its cost should be allocated between Federal, local government and private interests.
The overall cost of modernizing the nation's airports has been and will
continue to be very large. We have been advised that over $3 billion has
been spent on military airports in the United States since 1951. During the
same period, only $116 million of Federal funds (exclusive of special appropriations such as those for the National Airport in Washington, D. C.)
have been invested in civil airports. This amount was spent under the 1946
Federal Airport Act, which authorized a total of $500 million, of which
only $212 million has been spent since the Act was passed. The total investment in civil airports, including Federal, local government and private
is not known, but construction costs are, in general, borne predominantly
by local governments and private interests. Some figures regarding the
investment made at the four major airports in the New York metropolitan
area are cited to illustrate, in a general way, the magnitude of the expenditures required.
Ninety-two million dollars (exclusive of the purchase price of Teterboro
and prior governmental investments in the other three fields) has been invested by the Port of New York Authority in Idlewild, LaGuardia, Newark
and Teterboro during the past eight years. The Federal contribution under
the 1946 Airport Act was $9 million in addition to this amount. Current
plans for the next ten years indicate an additional local expenditure of
about $175 million with the requirements beyond 1956 unpredictable on the
basis of available data, but in all likelihood involving substantial additional
sums. This local expenditure of about $268 million on four airports over
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a 15 to 20 year span may be compared with the program Congress recently
passed calling for Federal assistance of $251 million over the next four
years for all of the nation's civil airports.
The question of how much of the cost of construction of the nation's
civil airports should be borne by the Federal Government has been hotly
debated for many years. Some objections have been raised to any Federal
participation on the grounds that this would constitute unwarranted government assistance to the comercial air carriers.
It must be recognized, we believe, that it has been a traditional government policy to render Federal financial assistance, in one form or another,
to almost every type of transportation at some time during its development.
This assistance has often been and logically should be withdrawn when
without it an industry can produce the required public services and when
national security considerations permit. The airlines of the United States
have matured as an industry, and with few exceptions, the air carriers
should be expected to pay reasonable amounts for services received and
facilities utilized. It is impractical, however, except under very special
circumstances, for them to build their own airports, install their own navigation aids, or set up their own traffic control facilities. They must, for the
most part, share publicly provided facilities with military and many other
civil users. The determination of who should pay how much for the use of
these facilities can and should proceed simultaneously with the provision
of the facilities themselves.
Among the airport improvements which are required are longer and
stronger runways, clear approach zones, high-speed taxi turnoffs, high intensity lighting, larger passenger and cargo handling areas, enlarged utility
systems - to name but a few. Certain airport deficiencies have been acceptable to date with low performance aircraft, but those now being operated
and those shortly to take to the air are far more demanding on the landing
facilities provided for them.
A consideration of no small concern from a national defense standpoint
which seems to require special note, is the fact that although civil airports
should and must provide a reserve for military use in time of emergency to
our knowledge, no single civil airport in the country is capable, at the
present time, of handling the Air Forces' principal long range bombers at
full operational loads on a sustained basis. What this means to the military's
ability to disperse its forces in time of emergency is obvious.
In conclusion, then, the responsibility for the financing of individual
civil airports and the responsibility for their management and individual
planning should remain at the local level. But the Federal Government must
accept responsibility for overall planning of a national airport system as
part of the national Aviation Facilities concept and for the programming
of such additional funds, both direct and supplemental, as may need to be
invested in airports in the national interest. Any other course of action
could only lead to confusion and wasteful inadequacy.
SECTION 5-

GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

By J. Gordon Bennett, Jr.
Prior to 1926-the infant days of aviation -matters
pertaining to
navigation aids, communications, and air traffic control were the responsibility of the Bureau of Lighthouses. The Air Commerce Act of 1926 created
an Assistant Secretary to help the Secretary of Commerce foster air commerce and designate air routes.
The Air Mail Act of 1934 established a commission to recommend a
U. S. aviation policy. The recommendations of this commission contributed
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to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 which created an independent agency
called the Civil Aeronautics Authority. The Civil Aeronautics Authority
was responsible not only for developing, installing, and operating airways
and air traffic control facilities, but also for economic and safety regulation
and accident investigation.
Under Reorganization Plans III and IV of 1940, President Roosevelt
the adjudicating, ecodivided the Civil Aeronautics Authority -keeping
nomic, and accident investigation functions, and the promulgation of broad
safety regluations under what we now know as the Civil Aeronautics Board.
He placed airports, safety enforcement, airways, communications, and air
traffic control under the Civil Aeronautics Administration. He then put the
Civil Aeronautics Administration within the Department of Commerce,
where it remains today.
From 1938 to 1946 there was a massive expansion and technical growth
of aviation, domestic and international, civil and military. Aviation thus
spread out into many new areas of our governmental structure. In order
to have a coordinated government policy on both domestic and international
aviation, the President in 1946 established the Air Coordinating Committee.
The mission of the Air Coordinating Committee was to examine aviation
problems and developments affecting more than one participating agency
and to develop and recommend integrated policies.
As post-war civil and military air traffic increased, delays caused by
inadequate air navigation and traffic control facilities increased. To meet
their individual needs, civil and military agencies were developing separate
devices for air navigation and traffic control. In 1947 the need for development of a single or "common system" was recognized and an industrygovernment advisory organization, founded in 1935, and known as the Radio
Technical Commission for Aeronautics, drew up the basic requirements of
such a system.
In order to keep the civil and military agencies coordinated in the implementation of this long-range effort, the Air Navigation Development
Board was created in 1948. The Air Navigation Development Board was
charged with preparing a single budget for all research and development
required in connection with the common system, and neither the civil nor
the military agencies were to begin or maintain any research and development without the express authorization of the Board.
In summary then, the present responsibility for Aviation Facilities
development, within the Government, is distributed somewhat as follows:
The Civil Aeronautics Administration has the responsibility
for operating the airways.
The military services fly under Civil Aeronautics Administration's control but must, of necessity, provide certain traffic control
and air navigation services to meet their own requirements, if the
Civil Aeronautics Administration is unable to meet them.
The Air Coordinating Committee has the responsibility for coordinating board aviation policies.
The Air Navigation Development Board is responsible for coordinating Aviation Facilities development programs.
The Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics is a government-industry advisory organization with no continuing official
government status; which serves upon request.
There are now over 75 committees, subcommittees, and special working
groups addressing themselves to Aviation Facilities matters. The existence
of so many groups is not, in itself, an evil, but it is increasingly apparent
that the process of coordination is becoming more and more time consuming,
and that preoccupation with current issues tends to obscure forward vision.
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SECTION 6-

THE ORGANIZATION OF A STUDY LEADING TO A PLAN

FOR A NATIONAL AVIATION FACILITIES SYSTEM

By N. E. Halaby
It is clear that a great deal of effort has been made to coordinate the
activities of various government departments and agencies in the development and operation of Aviation Facilities. But it is also clear that the
development of the required facilities is lagging far behind the needs of
aviation. It seems appropriate to re-examine the organizational structure
of the government for handling the planning, programming, and development of a national Aviation Facilities system.
We find that none of the interdepartmental committees dealing with coordination has any independent executive authority. Their members serve
only on a part-time basis and the membership changes frequently. While it
was originally intended that, in addition to exercising their coordinating
functions, they would be instrumentalities for the development of forward
looking policies, they have, in practice, become primarily mechanisms wherein the representatives of various Federal agencies meet to debate and,
whenever possible, coordinate action on pressing current problems. Furthermore, the coordination among the committees themselves has become a
problem, and the delineation of their respective functions is not always
clear.
It is not our desire to belittle the useful functions which these organizations perform, but we do wish to note their practical limitations. We
think it is abundantly clear that, because of their basic structure, they
cannot be expected to provide the dynamic leadership required for origination and development of a comprehensive national Aviation Facilities
system. Certain essential elements of effective government action seem to
be missing-full time direction, full disclosure of departmental information and plans, closely coordinated budgetary planning and funding, and a
unified approach to the Congress in matters of appropriations.
Most of the reports which come out of these committees appear to be
statements of requirements, which may be excellent in themselves; but these
requirements require budgetary support and authoritative decision and
assignment of necessary resources before they can become programs ready
to be put into action.
A recent report of Special Working Group No. 13 of the Air Coordinating Committee, entitled "Aids to Air Navigation and Landing," contains
two statements which illustrate the problem:
"It has been concluded that 'research and development programs
have been severely handicapped for lack of continued participation
of operational planning groups.' Such groups 'after writing reports
and recommendations, disbanded and their sponsoring agencies did
not continue to review progress and keep operational requirements
up to date.'
"There has been insufficient recognition of air traffic control
requirements from a budgetary standpoint. Not only is strong
budgetary support needed for the immediate needs of the air traffic
control system, but strong support is needed for a proper research
and development program for air traffic control. This is essential
because it is impossible to imagine that any air traffic control system will in itself become the ultimate. Keeping pace with the rapid
advancements in aircraft design will actually result in a series of
so-called 'ultimate' systems which through evolution will in themselves become interim transitions to a better system."
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It seems evident that there is a need for forceful, high level direction
of the studies leading to a national Aviation Facilities program. Inasmuch
as the regular departments of the government are fully occupied with heavy
operating responsibilities which are diverse and sometimes conflicting, and
as the interdepartmental committees are fully occupied in resolving day-today conflicts, it seems logical to conclude, as we have done, that the direction
of the study necessary for intelligent future planning should be established
elsewhere in the government.
It is our conclusion that the study should be undertaken within the
framework of the executive branch and should be headed by an individual
serving under a temporary appointment in the Executive Office of the
President.
The personal qualifications of the individual selected for this assignment
are of paramount importance, in our opinion. He will have to exercise a
high degree of leadership in dealing with the disputes which will inevitably
arise as a result of the varying objectives of the users of our airspace. The
Armed Forces, for example, aggressively strive for optimum combat performance other considerations being secondary. The airlines put safety
and economy ahead of maximum performance. The owners and operators
of small private and miscellaneous commercial aircraft are often unable to
afford some of the very expensive and heavy equipment that the military,
the airlines and large business aircraft operators may be willing to buy,
and therefore sometimes find themselves at odds with both the military and
the scheduled airlines.
We believe that placing responsibility on an individual is more likely
to produce successful results than would be the case if the assignment were
made to a board, committee or commission, although we recognize that the
individual selected might desire an advisory commission or committee to
help him, and may need to enlist the aid of talents available outside of the
government.
We believe the urgency of the problem is such that no effort should be
spared to find an individual of superior talents and proper background who
has the President's confidence and who can work on a basis of mutual trust
and respect with those members of the Cabinet most directly concerned.

